NOTES

CHANGING RULES OF EVIDENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
At common law,' interested witnessesl were not permitted to testify in their
own behalf in civil or criminal4 cases. Spouses, for additional reasons of policy,5
were held incompetent to testify either for or against each other 6 Prior to statutory modifications of these common law rules of competency 7 there was unaniI Prior to the development of the modem jury trial, questions of competency of witnesses
did not arise since the jury found a verdict of their own knowledge. For the development of the
jury, see Hinton, Cases on Evidence (2d ed. 193), c. i, § 1; I Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923),
985; 9 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1926), 178-185.
The interest disqualification was based on the theory that interested persons were biased
and hence not credible; also the courts were unwilling to subject the interested witness to the
temptation to commit perjury. New Arcade v. Owens, 258 Fed. 965 (D.C. Ct. App. 1919);
Skahen v. Strauss, 199 Ill. App. 4o3 (y916); Gilbert, Evidence ( 4 th ed. 1777) ii9. For some
exceptions to the interest disqualification because of necessity see United States v. Clark, 96
U.S. 37, 24 L. Ed. 696 (1877). Parmelee v. McNulty, 19 Ill. 556 (1858); County v. Leidy, io
Pa. 45 (1848).
To disqualify, the interest had to be "some legal, certain and immediate interest in the result of the suit itself, or in the record thereof as an instrument of evidence to support his own
claims." Poe v. Dorrah, 2o Ala. 288 (1852); Evans v. Eaton, 7 Wheat. (U.S.) 356, 5 L. Ed. 472
(1822); Ackman v. Potter, 239 Ill. 578, 88 N.E. 231 (1909).
Parties to the suit were of course directly interested as thus defined. For others who were
considered disqualified because of interest, see i Wigmore, supra note i, 996 if; 5 Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence (i916), § 3669; Jones, Evidence (3d ed. 1924), c. 20.
2 By 1582 the rule in civil cases was well established, Dymoke's Case, Savile 34, pl. 18.
Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 209, ioL. Ed. 129 (1839); Marks v. Butler, 24 Ill. 568 (186o);
2

Frear v. Everton, 20 Johns. (N.Y.) 142 (1822); Radtke v. Taylor, io5 Ore. 559,
(1922); i Wigmore, supra note i, 99o ff.

210

Pac. 863

4 Whelchell v. State, 23 Ind. 89 (1864); Harwell v. State, io Lea (Tenn.) 544 (1882). The
disqualification developed later in criminal cases than in civil. x Wigmore, supra note i, 995
n. 42; 9 Holdsworth, supra note i, 196. The complaining witness or prosecutor was not excluded under the rule since neither were parties to the record. Best, Evidence ( 4 th ed. i866),

238.
5 The reasons usually given: i. Likelihood of false testimony because of a common interest.
Merriam v. Hartford Ry. Co., 20 Conn. 354 (i85o); Gilbert, Law of Evidence ( 4 th ed. 1777),
133. 2. Metaphysical unity. Coke Litt. 6b, Wigmore, Cases on Evidence ( 3 d ed. 1932), i6.
3. Public policy to prevent marital disharmony. Mitchinson v. Cross, 58 Ill. 366 (1871); Bird
v. Davis, 14 N.J. Eq. 467 (x862).
6 Civil cases: Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 2o9, io L. Ed. 129 (x839); Schreffler v.
Chase, 245 Ill. 395, 92 N.E. 272 (1910).
Criminal cases: Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189,41 Sup. Ct. 98, 65 L. Ed. 214
(1920); Barber v. People, 203 Ill. 543, 68 N.E. 93 (1903); Wilke v. People, 53 N.Y. 525 (1873).
That the incompetency was absolute and did not rest on privilege see Stein v. Bowman, 13
Pet. (U.S.) 209, io L. Ed. 129 (1839); Ex parte Beville, 58 Fla. 170, 50 So. 685 (19o9); but see
Ficken v. State, 97 Ga. 813, 25 S.E. 925 (1895).
7
a. The first outstanding attack on the exclusionary rules of evidence was made by Bentham in 1827. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, bk. IX, pt. 3; I Wigmore, supra, note
i, 997, 1002; Appleton, Evid. (x86o), c. i, 4; Phil. Evid. (sth Am. ed.), 24 f.

b. Civil Cases.
In England the interest disqualification for witnesses was not removed until 1843 (St. 6 & 7
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mous agreement both among the various states and between federal and state
courts as to the inadmissibility of such evidence. 8
In civil cases, this uniformity between federal and state courts as to competency of witnesses continued despite the legislative abolition by the states of
the common law testimonial disqualifications,9 by operation of conformity
statutes 0 directing the federal courts to follow state rules of evidence.
Vict. c. 85) by Lord Denman's Act, which specifically excepted parties to the suit and spouses.
Parties to the action were not made competent in civil cases until 185i. St. i4 & i5 Vict. c. 99.
In the United States the development came later. i Wigmore, id., oo4, note 4 and § 488.
Parties and witnesses were not made competent in the Federal courts until x864. Rev. Stat.
§ 858, 28 U.S.C.A. § 631 (as amended). Monongahela National Bank v. Jacobus, iog U.S.
275, 3 Sup. Ct. 219, 27 L. Ed. 935 (1883); De Beaumont v. Webster, 8i Fed. 535 (C.C.A. 3 d
1897). For other cases see 28 U.S.C.A. 631.
Today the disqualification has everywhere disappeared. i Wigmore, id., ioo4, the various
state statutes being listed at p. 870.
c. Criminal Cases.
The abolition of the interest disqualification in criminal cases came later both in America
and England. For suggested explanations see i Wigmore, id., ioog.
In England the defendant was not competent until i898. St. 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, § x;Rex v.
Wheeler, [1916] 1 K.B. 283. Best, Evidence (8th ed. 1916), § 822 A.
In the federal courts the defendant was made competent in 1878. 20 Stat. 30 (1878),
28 U.S.C.A. 632 (1928). For state statutes see x Wigmore, id., § 488.
d. Spouses.
Incompetency of spouses was not abolished by statute in civil cases in England until x853
(St. i6 & 17 Vict. c. 83, § 4; 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, § 3, i869), and in criminal cases not until 1898
(St. 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, § x)all of which are reprinted in i Wigmore, supra, note i, § 488.
In the United States the removal occurred later. x Wigmore, id., io36. Civil Cases: In re
Domenig, 128 Fed. 146 (D.C.Pa. i9o4); Brown v. Norton, 67 Ind. 424 (1879); Shepard v.
Parker, 97 Me. 86, 53 Atl. 879 (1902); Evans v. Evans, 155 Pa. 572, 26 Atl. 755 (1893). Criminal Cases: Walker v. State, 34 Fla. 167, i6 So. 8 (1894); Commonwealth v. Moore, 162 Mass.
44i, 38 N.E. 1120 (1894); People v. Hovey, 92 N.Y. 554 (1883); State v. Reynolds, 48 S.C. 384,
26 S.E 679 (1896) (spouse permitted to testify against her husband).
Some states require the consent of the other spouse. In re Holt, 56 Minn. 33 (1893); Hubbell v. Grant, 39 Mich. 641 (1878); Stanley v. Stanley, 27 Wash. 570 (1902); State v. Willis,
119 Mo. 485 (1894).
8 See cases supra, note 7.
9 See supra, note 7.
10All the applicable statutes will be included in this note for convenient reference.
a. 12 Stat. 588, Act "of July i6, 1862, c. I8q, § x; as amended Rev. Stat. 858 (I9O6), 28
U.S.C.A. 631 (1928):
"The competency of a witness to testify in any civil action, suit or proceeding in the courts
of the United States shall be determined by the laws of the State or Territory in which the court
is held."
In its original wording the section was construed not to apply to federal criminal trials.
The Abbotsford, 98 U.S. 440, 25 L. Ed. 168 (1878) ; Logan v. United States, x44 U.S. 263, 30I
ft., 12 Sup. Ct. 617,36 L. Ed. 429 (1892); Hendrix v. United States 219 U.S. 79,31 Sup. Ct. 193,
55 L. Ed. 102 (igiO). The same is true of the section in its present form. Adams v. United

States,
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(C.C.A. 8th i919).

b. 17 Stat. 197, Act of June i, 1872, c. 255, § 5, 28 U.S.C.A. 724 (1928):
"The practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding in civil cases, other than equity
or admiralty causes, in the district courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice,
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In criminal cases, on the other hand, a divergence soon appeared due to decisions which prevented state statutory liberalizations of rules of competency
from being reflected in the federal courts," by holding that the various conformity acts did not apply to criminal prosecutions.12 Conflicting interpretations of these and other applicable Supreme Court cases, however, created some
uncertainty as to the law which should control,3 though all agreed on the negative proposition that the law which did govern competency in federal criminal
cases was not affected by subsequent state statutes.' 4 Three bodies-of law were
suggested: (i) The common law rules of evidence fixed unchangeably (in the
absence of further congressional action) as they existed in 1789, the date of the
passage of the Judiciary Act. 5 This view was followed by the majority of
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts
of record of the State within which such district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding."
By its terms this section applies only to civil proceedings.
c. i Stat. 92, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 34, as amended Rev. St. 721 (1878), 28 U.S.C.A.
725 (r928):

"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the
United States otherwise require or provide shall be regarded as rules of decisions in trials at
common law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
This section as construed by the federal courts does not apply to rules of evidence in criminal
prosecutions. United States v. Reid, 12 How., (U.S.) 361, 13 L. Ed. 1023 (i8sx); Logan v.
United States, i44 U.S. 263, 3oo, 12 Sup. Ct. 617,36 L. Ed. 429 (1892); American Ry. Express
Co. v. Rowe, 14 F. (2d) 269 (C.C.A. Xst 1926), cert. denied 273 U.S. 743, 47 Sup. Ct. 336, 71
L. Ed. 869 (1927).
The courts are divided on the question of whether this section compels them to follow state
rules of evidence in civil cases. Holding that it does are Wilcox v. Hunt, 13 Pet. (U.S.) 378, 1o
L. Ed. 209 (1839); Gormley v. Clark, 134 U.S. 338, 10 Sup. Ct. 554, 33 L. Ed. 9o9 (189 o ); Stewart v. Morris, 89 Fed. 290 (C.C.A. 7th 1898); Von Crome v. Traveler's Ins. Co. 1x F.(2d) 350
(C.C.A. 8th 1926). For other cases see 28 U.S.C.A. § 725 (1928), note 84. Contra, explaining
away the Supreme Court decisions, are Union Pacific Rr. Co. v. Yates, 79 Fed. 584 (C.C.A. 8th
1897); Gilbert v. American Surety Co., 121 Fed. 499 (C.C.A. 7th 1902), cert. denied 190 U.S.
56o, 23 Sup. Ct. 855, 47 L. Ed. 1184 (iqo3); Mankato v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 142 Fed.
329 (C.C.A. 8th 19o5). For other cases-see 28 U.S.C.A. 725, note 83.
d. For other related statutes and statutory chronology of those cited above see Sweeney,
Federal or State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 27 Inl. L. Rev. 394, 400 (1932).
"lThus in Fitter v. United States, 258 Fed. 567 (C.C.A. 2d 1919), the wife of the defendant
was not permitted to testify in his behalf in the federal courts, though she would have been
competent in a prosecution in the state court under People v. Hovey, 92 N.Y. 554 (1883).
"2 Cases and statutes, supra note io.
13See cases infra, notes x5, 16, 17. The leading Supreme Court cases will be discussed in
detail below. See also Sweeney, Federal or State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 27 Ill.
L. Rev. 394, 400 (932).
'4

See cases infra, notes 15, i6, 17.

SThe cases following this view purport to rely upon United States v. Reid, 12 How. (U.S.)
361, 13 L. Ed. 1023 (i85i). The validity of this interpretation will be discussed subsequently.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
courts., 6

(2) The rules of evidence fixed unchangeably (in the absence of further congressional legislation) as they existed in the individual state at the time
of it admission into the Union, thus including whatever statutory changes in
the common law the territorial legislatures had enacted before such admission.' 7
(3) A third view refused, to regard the rules of evidence as crystallized into immobility and declared that the courts had power to modify the common law
rules (even in the absence of Congressional action) when necessitated by changing societal conditions. 5
Up to 1933 the results of the operation of these tendencies were these: In
civil cases virtually all the states had abolished the common law disqualifications of witnesses and spouses. Since this was reflected in the federal courts by
the conformity acts, there was uniformity both among the federal courts themselves and between the federal and state courts as to rules of competency in
civil cases. In criminal cases state statutes abolishing incompetency were not
thus reflected, and since three dissimilar views were adopted as stated above,
conflicting rules of competency prevailed not only between federal and state
courts but among the various federal courts themselves. This divergence was
not bridged by federal legislation. 9
At the October 1933 term, in Funk v. United States,"° the Supreme Court conclusively affirmed the power of the federal courts to modify the common law
rules of evidence without statutory assistance by'Congress, and definitely re6 United States v. Hal], 53 Fed. 352 (D.C.Pa. 1892); United States v. Hughes, 175 Fed. 238
(D.C.W.D.Pa. igio); Maxey v. United States, 207 Fed. 327 (C.C.A. 8th 1913); Fisher v. United
States, 32 F. (2d) 602 (W.C.C.A. 4th 1929); Barton v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 967 (C.C.A. 4th
1928); Scaffidi v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 203 (C.C.A. Ist 1930).

Brown v. United States,,233 Fed. 353 (C.C.A. 6th 1916) (dictum); McCoy v. United States,
Fed. 861 (witness convicted of a felony held competent because the territorial legislature,
prior to the admission of the state into the Union, had removed the disqualification); Ding v.
United States, 247 Fed. 12 (C.C.A. 9th igi8) (atheist held competent for the same reason);
Rendleman v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 27 (C.C.A. 9th 1927) (wife held competent for same
reason).
'7
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18Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, 62 L. Ed. 406 (igi8). The authority of this case was considered to be questionable in view of subsequent cases. See Leach, State
Law of Evidence in Federal Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 565 (1930). Funk v. United States,
290 U.S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (1933) affirms the Rosen case, however. Both will be discussed
in detail below.
19Where Congress has passed specific legislation, such provisions control, Cohen v. United
States, 214 Fed. 23 (C.C.A. 9th 2924), cert. denied 235 U.S. 696, 35 Sup. Ct. I9g; Parker v.
United States, 3 F. (2d) 903 (C.C.A. 9th 1925). For example, the defendant in a criminal case
is made a competent witness in the federal courts regardless of the state law by 2o Stat. 30
(2878), 28 U.S.C.A. § 632 (1928).
In 1887 Congress made competent the spouse of a defendant in a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. Act of March 3, 2887, c. 397, § 1, 28 U.S.C.A. 633 (1928). This was the sole legislation on the subject during the period.
2oFunk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (i933), where a wife was permitted
to testify for her husband in a criminal case. At common law she would have been incompetent.
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jected the views which held the rules of competency were fixed unalterably as of
any one time.
Funk v. United States will therefore have a threefold effect on rules of evidence in criminal cases: (i) It will level off the differences between federal and
state courts on rules of competency, by bringing the federal law into conformity
with those of a great majority of the states. (2) It will also make for uniformity
among the various federal courts since it definitely overrules the view that the
federal rules of evidence are those which existed in each state at the time of its
admission into the Union. (3) It frees the federal courts from the anomalous
necessity, under modem conditions, of following the common law rules of 1789,
and by rejecting the doctrine that such adherence was mandatory, lays down a
principle which will permit further development in the same direction. The
court based this principle, however, upon an interpretation of the prior Supreme
Court cases which resulted in the uncertainty and conflict already described.
In order to permit further growth without the confusion which attended that
growth heretofore, and because of its importance in the future development of
the law of evidence the principle requires a clear enunciation and restatement.
The primary cause of the confusion was a misunderstanding of the scope of
the decision in the case which first raised the direct question of the proper rules
of evidence to be applied in criminal cases in the federal courts, United States v.
Reid2" (decided in 1851). This was a criminal prosecution brought in a federal
court in Virginia, and involved the competency of a witness to testify for the
defendant. The witness would have been incompetent at common law, but
under a statute passed in Virginia some sixty years after the federal Judiciary
Act he became competent to testify in the state courts. Thus the question was
presented whether such state statute would be given any effect in the federal
courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that:
The laws of the several States ....

shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at

common law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.
The Supreme Court decided the Act did not apply to criminal cases22 and that the
witness was incompetent, holding that Congress by this section of the Judiciary
States v. Reid, 12 How. (U.S.) 361, 13 L. Ed. 1023 (i851).
" We are not interested here in the question of the correctness of this interpretation by the
Reid case. i Wigmore, supra note z, § 6 calls this an indefensible construction. See also Leach,
State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 556 (1930). Chief Justice
Taney reasoned that Congress intended by the act to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts,
without which they could not have administered the laws of the states, and that the wording
would have to be more definite to include the rules of evidence of the states, since so to hold
would be to "place the criminal jurisprudence of one sovereignty under the control of another."
From that premise he reasoned by a process of elimination that Congress could not have intended the common law of England to control, nor the common law of the colonies, and that
"the only known rule upon the subject which can be supposed to have been in the minds of the
men who framed these acts of Congress, was that which was then in force in the respective states
[at the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789], and which they were accustomed to see in daily and
familiar practice in the state courts." 22 How. (U.S.) 361, 365, i3 L. Ed. r023, 1025 (i85I).
21United
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Act had directed the federal courts to apply the rules of evidence in force "in the
respective states" at the time that Act was passed, 1789, and that the common
law rules so adopted and established could not be changed by subsequent state
legislation.
This decision was implicitly understood to mean that in the absence of a new
statutory direction by Congress the rules of evidence were fixed unchangeably
as they existed in 1789. The line of reasoning by which this result was reached
may be articulated thus:
The Reid case decided (i) that Congress had in the judiciary Act directed the
federal courts to follow the common law rules of competency of 1789, and (2) that
subsequent state statutes could not change those rules.
Abolition of incompetency was effected solely through state statutes which under
(2) left the federal rule unchanged.
Any decision which would attempt to abolish a common law disqualification without
action by Congress, therefore, would be erroneous, since it would be contrary to the
Reid case and would be disregarding the judiciary Act.
Therefore the -rules of evidence in the federal courts are fixed unchangeably as
they were in 1789 unless Congress chooses to modify them by statute.
A court which so understood the Reid case would consequently feel compelled
to overrule it, in part, to justify a change in the common law rules of competency. And conversely, a court which, in abolishing a common law rule of competency, felt it necessary to overrule the Reid case, would implicitly indicate
that it had so interpreted the Reid case, whether it had articulated the line of
reasoning or not. The first Supreme Court to clearly demonstrate this implicit
analysis was Rosen v. United States23 in which the court said:
While the decision in United States v. Reid has not been specifically overruled, its
authority must be regarded as seriously shaken .....
24

23 Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, 62 L. Ed. 4o6 (r918). The question
raised was as to the competency, in a federal court in New York, of a witness previously convicted of a felony in the state courts of New York. The court believed it was overruling the
common law rule by holding the witness competent and decided the question "in the light
of sound reason."
Professor Hinton points out in 22 Ill.
L. Rev. 545, 551 (1928) that the case could have been
decided upon the ground that the conviction was by a court of a different sovereignty and that
by the common law rule such a conviction did not make the witness incompetent, citing Brown
v. United States, 233 Fed. 353 (C.C.A. 6th i916), L.R.A. ii 7 A, 1133 (note).
24 The Rosen case relies upon two prior Supreme Court decisions to justify its conclusion
that the Reid case was not sound law, discerning in them an inconsistency with the holding in
the Reid case:
(i) Logan v. United States, i44 U.S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed. 429 (1892), which
raised the converse of the issue in the Rosen case, the witness being competent at common law,
but incompetent under a statute of Texas passed after it had come into the Union. While it
was a republic, Texas had adopted the common law in general terms. In upholding the competency of the witness in the federal court of Texas in a criminal trial, the Supreme Court opinion said:
......the competency of witnesses in criminal trials in the courts of the United States held
within the State of Texas is not governed by a statute of the State which was first enacted in
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Funk v. United States confirms this analysis.25 By so interpreting the Reid
case however, Rosen v. United States presented a distorted picture of the decision (which the Funk case perpetuates), since it implied that the Reid case intended to anchor the laws of evidence as they existed in 1789. This, it may be
suggested, the Reid case did not purport to do, and to so understand the decision demonstrates a subtle misconception of the nature of the common law
which has confused the cases in the past and may cause trouble in the future.
And it creates the apparent incongruity of state statutes automatically becomx85g, but, except so far as Congress has made specific provisions upon the subject, is governed
by the commuon law, which, as has been seen, was the law of Texas before the passage of that statute
and at the time of the admission of Texas into the Union as a state."
All the cases which adopt the view that competency is governed by the rules of evidence as
they existed in the individual states at the time of their admission to the Union (see supra, note
17) rely upon the italicized part of the quotation given above. When read in its context, however, this passage does not seem to justify that interpretation, though there is some difference
of opinion on the point. Professor Hinton in 22 Ill.
L. Rev. 545, 551 (1928) suggests that the
case does not conflict with United States v. Reid. Acc. Leach, State Law of Evidence in the
Federal Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 562 (1930); Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds,
dissenting in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 473, 38 Sup. Ct. 148, x51, 62 L. Ed. 406,
408 (1918). A contrary view is taken by Sweeney, Federal or State Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 27 Ill. L. Rev. 394, 414 (1932), and Justice Clarke speaking for the majority in
Rosen v. United States, id., 470.
(2) Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 13 Sup. Ct. 6o, 36 L. Ed. 99x (1892), which involved the competency of a joint indictee as a witness for the prosecution in a separate trial of
his co-indictee in a federal court. The Reid case had raised the same question with regard to a
witness called by the defendant. In answering the defendant's contention that the Reid case
was decisive of the case before it, the court in the Benson case said:
"The precise question in that case [United States v. Reid] was as to the right of the defendant to call his co-defendant, and not that of the government to call the co-defendant, and a
distinction has been taken between the two cases ..... And as the distinction prevailed,
whether founded on satisfactory reasons or not, it is sufficient to justify us in holding that that
case is not decisive of this..... We do not feel ourselves, therefore, precluded by that case
from examining this question in the light of general authority and sound reason."
The court then pointed out the great changes in competency wrought by statute, all tending
toward a liberalization of the strict common law rules, and continued: "The spirit of this legislation has controlled the decisions of the courts ..... " The court's lengthy discussion of this
point may indicate an incipient dissatisfaction with the state of the existing rules of evidence,
but the decision does not seem to overrule the Reid case. The court was only deciding what the
common law rule was on the question before it.
25 Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 212, 214 (1933) adopts the interpretation
of the Reid case given in Rosen v. United States:
"..... it is plain enough that the ultimate doctrine announced is that in the taking of testimony in criminal cases, the federal courts are bound by the rules of the commuon law as they existed at a definitely specified time in the respectivestates.
"With the conclusion that the controlling rule is that of the common law, the Benson case
and the Rosen case do not conflict; but both cases reject the notion, which the [Reid case seems]
to accept, that the courts, in the face of greatly changed conditions, are still chained to the ancient formulae and are powerless to declare and enforce modifications deemed to have been
wrought in the common law itself by force of these changed conditions."
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ing federal common law.26 A clarification of what the Reid case stands for
shows that it need not cause these difficulties.
The principles implicitly or expressly laid down by the Reid case may be separated as follows: (i) that Congress could prescribe the rules as to competency
of witnesses which should be followed in the federal courts; (2) that Congress
did not direct the federal courts in criminal cases to follow contemporary state
rules of evidence; (3) that Congress had impliedly directed the federal courts to
follow those rules of the common law in force "in the respective states"2 7 at
the time the Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed; (4) that state statutes passed
subsequent to 1789 would not be binding upon the federal courts. If there is
any inconsistency between the Reid case on the one hand and the Rosen and
Funk cases on the other, it must result from the implied Congressional mandate
that the federal courts were to follow the rules of evidence in force in the re6The following quotation from an article written before the Funk case was decided concretely illustrates this difficulty:
"No case was cited in the opinion [of the Rosen case] .... in which a court without express
legislative authority abolished the common law disqualification ..... And independent investigation has failed to reveal such a case. The Rosen case must, therefore, rest upon the principle that state legislation, whose tendency perhaps has been followed in federal legislation not
directly applicable to the case in hand, creates a weight of authority which the federal courts
may and must follow. That such a holding is revolutionary need hardly be suggested." Leach,
State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 562 (1930).
Though it is often said that there is no federal common law, a realistic view must recognize
it exists in the sense of "a- general common law existing throughout the United States, not, it
is true as a body of law distinct from the common law enforced in the states, but as containing
the general rules and principles." Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call, 181 U.S. 92, 21 Sup.
Ct. 56i, 45 L. Ed. 765 (19O1).
27 It is not altogether clear what the Reid case meant by this phrase. On the one hand there
is strong language in the case which specifically refers to the law of the individual state. On
the other hand, in support of the view that a general body of common law was meant (see
supra, note 26), it may be suggested (1) that the state laws were uniform at the time the Reid'
case was adopted and that the court consequently did not have a situation before it which required more precise language; (2) Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. i, lo L. Ed. 865 (1842) had been on
the books for ten years, holding that common law decisions in the individual states did not control the federal courts in certain substantive law fields. It seem incongruous to consider the
federal courts not bound to follow individual state rules when substantive law is involved and
a statute expressly directs the court to consider the "laws of the several states" as rules of decision (see supra, note io, c. for full text of the statute), and yet hold that when rules of evidence are involved, the laws of the individual states must be followed in the federal courts, even
though the statute involved in Swift v. Tyson was held inapplicable.
If this phrase is construed to have meant a general common law, Logan v. United States
supra note 24, may be treated as having applied the same rule as the Reid case, since it could
be held to prevail in each state upon entering the Union, not as the common law of the state,
but as the general common law of the whole country. Whether the Logan case adopts a distinct rule for the newer states or merely applies the rule of the Reid case, and whether the
Reid case adopts the rules of the individual states or a general body of common law does not
affect the validity of the subsequent analysis. The view will be adopted, however, that a general common law was adopted by the Reid case and that the Logan case is not inconsistent with
it. The recent cases so treat it. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 212; Wolfle v.
United States, 29 o U.S. 617, 54 Sup. Ct. 279 (1934).

NOTES
spective states in 1789, since all three cases are in accord as to the other principles. Clearly if the Reid case is to be interpreted as deciding that the rules of
evidence in the federal courts were anchored unchangeably as they existed in
1789 unless Congress chooses to modify them, the Funk case is inconsistent,
since it changes a common law rule without Congressional action in permitting
8
a spouse to testify in a criminal trial.2
That the Reid case should not be so interpreted can be shown by comparing
29
it to express statutory adoptions of the common law such as the Illinois statute
.... The common law of England so far as the same is applicable and of a general
nature, and all statutes .... prior to the fourth year of James the First .... shall
be the rule of decision .....
It has never been intimated that this section, which is substantially enacted
or judicially adopted in most of the states of the Union, crystallizes the rules of
evidence as of the time of James the First, or of the adoption of such statute, and
permits no additions or modifications.30 On the contrary, as both the Funk and
Rosen case recognize, one of the essential principles of the common law is the
power of growth.3'
If Congress, therefore, by a similar provision had in express words directed
the federal courts to follow the common law rules of evidence as they existed in
the respective states in 1789, it can hardly be questioned that such a statute
would not have been construed to paralyze the common law into immobility.
What the Reid case did, was to find by implication what such a statute would
have provided expressly. And there is no reason for holding the common law
to be unchangeably fixed because of an implied adoption when an express adoption would permit growth and change.
2 Funk v. United States, supra note 20. In reaching this result Justice Sutherland re-examined the bases of the spouses' disqualification at common law-interest and public policy(see supra, note 5) and showed their inapplicability in the light of "legislation and modem
thought." Competency of a wife to testify against her husband was not involved, and the
court expressly refused to decide that question.
The Funk case overrules Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 41 Sup. Ct. 98, 65
L. Ed. 214 (1920) which did not cite the Rosen case as necessitating any change. See also
Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79, 31 Sup. Ct. 193, 55 L. Ed. X02 (1910).
c. 28.
29 Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (933),
23On the contrary, as an Illinois court has pointed out in discussing this statute:
" ... they [the English courts] have made many innovations upon its original principles,
and .... many of them have become much modified or wholly changed. The courts of the
several States have also taken advantage of its pliant nature, in which consists one of its greatest excellencies, and adapted it to the evervarying exigencies of the country, and to the everchanging conditions of society. This results from necessity; and in our further progressive improvement, other and more extensive modifications will be effected." Boyer v. Sweet, 3 Scam.

(Ill.) 120 (1841).
3' The Rosen case itself shows this most strongly since without a statute it overthrew what
was unquestionably the common law rule of 1789 by holding a convicted felon to be a competent witness; and the Funk case stresses the same point: The "rules [of the common law] are
modified upon its own principles and not in violation of them." (Cited from People v. Randolph, 2 Park. Cr. Rep. (N.Y.) 174, 177).
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The Reid case in short, must be understood to have enunciated a simple,
sensible rule-Congress had directed the federal courts to follow in criminal
cases the rules of evidence of the common law of 1789. One of the essential principles of the law thus adopted as a rule of decision was the capacity to change
and grow.
With this rule of the Reid case, the holdings in the Rosen and Funk cases do
not conflict. They exemplify it; and reaffirm its validity. And in the light of
this analysis the apparent dilemma of state statutes becoming federal common
law dissolves,32 since in the process of growth the common law may be influenced by the same philosophical ideas and societal changes which lead legislatures to pass statutes abolishing disqualifications of witnesses. That the legislature reacts more quickly to the stimuli should not be considered to preempt the
field and to inhibit the natural development of the common law so as to prevent
it from reaching the same result. In fact it is entirely proper for the courts to
consider widespread legislation as one of the best indications that societal opinion has been modified.
Thus understood the words of the court in the Funk case take on a new significance when they state:
The final question to which we are thus brought .... is the question of the power of
these courts, in the complete absence of congressional legislation on the subject, to
declare and effectuate upon common law principles, what is the present rule upon a
given subject in the light of fundamentally altered conditions, without regard to
what has previously been declared and practiced. It has been said so often as to
have become axiomatic that the common law is not immutable but flexible, and by
its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.
If adhered to in its unconfused simplicity, the same principle will occasion
no difficulty in years to come when further changes necessitate reconsideration
of present rules of evidence.33
AnoLPr A. RuBmNSON
THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS BY BANKS TO
REPURCHASE SECURITIES
The case of Knass v. Madison &-Kedzie State Bank, is a typical sequel to cer-

tain banking excesses of the last decade.2 Defendant bank had sold securities to
complainant, and had agreed to repurchase' the securities at par or a slight dis32Supra, note 26.
33 The potentialities of the Funk case can already be discerned in the recognition of its application to rules of admissibility of testimony other than those relating to competency of witnesses. Wolfie v. United States, 29o U.S. 617, 54 Sup. Ct. 279 (1934).
x354 Ill. 554, 188 N.E. 836 (r933).
2 See Fribourg, The New York Mortgage Bond Situation, The Annalist (Dec. 22, 1933),
8o3; Williams, The Future of Mortgage Banking, Great Lakes Banker (Feb. 1934), 3.
3 The agreements were signed by a vice-president of defendant bank, generally without any
designation of official position or descriptiopersonae.

